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Abstract. Transactional access to databases is an important abstrac-
tion allowing programmers to consider blocks of actions (transactions) as
executing in isolation. The strongest consistency model is serializability,
which ensures the atomicity abstraction of transactions executing over
a sequentially consistent memory. Since ensuring serializability carries a
significant penalty on availability, modern databases provide weaker con-
sistency models, one of the most prominent being snapshot isolation. In
general, the correctness of a program relying on serializable transactions
may be broken when using weaker models. However, certain programs
may also be insensitive to consistency relaxations, i.e., all their properties
holding under serializability are preserved even when they are executed
over a weak consistent database and without additional synchronization.
In this paper, we address the issue of verifying if a given program is robust
against snapshot isolation, i.e., all its behaviors are serializable even if it
is executed over a database ensuring snapshot isolation. We show that
this verification problem is polynomial time reducible to a state reach-
ability problem in transactional programs over a sequentially consistent
shared memory. This reduction opens the door to the reuse of the classic
verification technology for reasoning about weakly-consistent programs.
In particular, we show that it can be used to derive a proof technique
based on Lipton’s reduction theory that allows to prove programs robust.
1 Introduction
Transactions simplify concurrent programming by enabling computations on
shared data that are isolated from other concurrent computations and resilient to
failures. Modern databases provide transactions in various forms corresponding
to different tradeoffs between consistency and availability. The strongest con-
sistency level is achieved with serializable transactions [20] whose outcome in
concurrent executions is the same as if the transactions were executed atomi-
cally in some order. Since serializability carries a significant penalty on avail-
ability, modern databases often provide weaker consistency models, one of the
most prominent being snapshot isolation (SI) [4]. Then, an important issue is to
ensure that the level of consistency needed by a given program coincides with
the one that is guaranteed by its infrastructure, i.e., the database it uses. One
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way to tackle this issue is to investigate the problem of checking robustness of
programs against consistency relaxations: Given a program P and two consis-
tency models S and W such that S is stronger than W , we say that P is robust
for S against W if for every two implementations IS and IW of S and W re-
spectively, the set of computations of P when running with IS is the same as its
set of computations when running with IW . This means that P is not sensitive
to the consistency relaxation from S to W , and therefore it is possible to reason
about the behaviors of P assuming that it is running over S, and no additional
synchronization is required when P runs over the weak model W such that it
maintains all its properties satisfied with S.
In this paper, we address the problem of verifying robustness of transactional
programs for serializability, against snapshot isolation. Under snapshot isolation,
any transaction t reads values from a snapshot of the database taken at its start
and t can commit only if no other committed transaction has written to a loca-
tion that t wrote to, since t started. Robustness is a form of program equivalence
between two versions of the same program, obtained using two semantics, one
more permissive than the other. It ensures that this permissiveness has no effect
on the program under consideration. The difficulty in checking robustness is to
apprehend the extra behaviors due to the relaxed model w.r.t. the strong model.
This requires a priori reasoning about complex order constraints between opera-
tions in arbitrarily long computations, which may need maintaining unbounded
ordered structures, and make robustness checking hard or even undecidable.
Our first contribution is to show that verifying robustness of transactional
programs against snapshot isolation can be reduced in polynomial time to the
reachability problem in concurrent programs under sequential consistency (SC).
This allows (1) to avoid explicit handling of the snapshots from where trans-
actions read along computations (since this may imply memorizing unbounded
information), and (2) to leverage available tools for verifying invariants/reach-
ability problems on concurrent programs. This also implies that the robustness
problem is decidable for finite-state programs, PSPACE-complete when the num-
ber of sites is fixed, and EXPSPACE-complete otherwise. This is the first result
on the decidability and complexity of the problem of verifying robustness in the
context of transactional programs. The problem of verifying robustness has been
considered in the literature for several models, including eventual and causal
consistency [5, 9, 10, 11, 19]. These works provide (over- or under-)approximate
analyses for checking robustness, but none of them provides precise (sound and
complete) algorithmic verification methods for solving this problem.
Based on this reduction, our second contribution is a proof methodology
for establishing robustness which builds on Lipton’s reduction theory [17]. We
use the theory of movers to establish whether the relaxations allowed by SI are
harmless, i.e., they don’t introduce new behaviors compared to serializability.
We applied the proposed verification techniques on 10 challenging applica-
tions extracted from previous work [2, 5, 10, 13, 15, 18, 23]. These techniques
were enough for proving or disproving the robustness of these applications.
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p1:
t1: [r1 = y //0
x = 1]
||
p2:
t2: [r2 = x //0
y = 1]
(a) Write Skew (WS).
[r1 = y; x = 1] [r2 = x; y = 1]
conflict
conflict
(b) A WS execution trace.
Fig. 1: Examples of non-robust programs illustrating the difference between SI
and serializability. causal dependency means that a read in a transaction obtains
its value from a write in another transaction. conflict means that a write in a
transaction is not visible to a read in another transaction, but it would affect
the read value if it were visible. Here, happens-before is the union of the two.
2 Overview
In this section, we give an overview of our approach for checking robustness
against snapshot isolation. While serializability enforces that transactions are
atomic and conflicting transactions, i.e., which read or write to a common lo-
cation, cannot commit concurrently, SI [4] allows that conflicting transactions
commit in parallel as long as they don’t contain a write-write conflict, i.e., write
on a common location. Moreover, under SI, each transaction reads from a snap-
shot of the database taken at its start. These relaxations permit the “anomaly”
known as Write Skew (WS) shown in Figure 1a, where an anomaly is a pro-
gram execution which is allowed by SI, but not by serializability. The execution
of Write Skew under SI allows the reads of x and y to return 0 although this
cannot happen under serializability. These values are possible since each trans-
action is executed locally (starting from the initial snapshot) without observing
the writes of the other transaction.
Execution trace. Our notion of program robustness is based on an abstract
representation of executions called trace. Informally, an execution trace is a set
of events, i.e., accesses to shared variables and transaction begin/commit events,
along with several standard dependency relations between events recording the
data-flow. The transitive closure of the union of all these dependency relations
is called happens-before. An execution is an anomaly if the happens-before of its
trace is cyclic. Figure 1b shows the happens-before of the Write Skew anomaly.
Notice that the happens-before order is cyclic in both cases.
Semantically, every transaction execution involves two main events, the is-
sue and the commit. The issue event corresponds to a sequence of reads and/or
writes where the writes are visible only to the current transaction. We interpret
it as a single event since a transaction starts with a database snapshot that it up-
dates in isolation, without observing other concurrently executing transactions.
The commit event is where the writes are propagated and made visible to all
processes. Under serializability, the two events coincide, i.e., they are adjacent
in the execution. Under SI, this is not the case and in between the issue and the
commit of the same transaction, we may have issue/commit events from concur-
rent transactions. When a transaction commit does not occur immediately after
its issue, we say that the underlying transaction is delayed. For example, the
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following execution of WS corresponds to the happens-before cycle in Figure 1b
where the write to x was committed after t2 finished, hence, t1 was delayed:
begin(p1, t1)ld(p1, t1, y, 0)isu(p1, t1, x, 1) com(p1, t1)
begin(p2, t2)ld(p2, t2, x, 0)isu(p2, t2, y, 1)com(p2, t2)
Above, begin(p1, t1) stands for starting a new transaction t1 by process p1, ld
represents read (load) actions, while isu denotes write actions that are visible only
to the current transaction (not yet committed). The writes performed during t1
become visible to all processes once the commit event com(p1, t1) takes place.
Reducing robustness to SC reachability. The above SI execution can be
mimicked by an execution of the same program under serializability modulo an
instrumentation that simulates the delayed transaction. The local writes in the
issue event are simulated by writes to auxiliary registers and the commit event is
replaced by copying the values from the auxiliary registers to the shared variables
(actually, it is not necessary to simulate the commit event; we include it here
for presentation reasons). The auxiliary registers are visible only to the delayed
transaction. In order that the execution be an anomaly (i.e., not possible under
serializability without the instrumentation) it is required that the issue and the
commit events of the delayed transaction are linked by a chain of happens-before
dependencies. For instance, the above execution for WS can be simulated by:
begin(p1, t1)ld(p1, t1, y, 0)st(p1, t1, rx, 1) st(p1, t1, x, rx)
begin(p2, t2)ld(p2, t2, x, 0)isu(p2, t2, y, 1)com(p2, t2)
The write to x was delayed by storing the value in the auxiliary register rx and
the happens-before chain exists because the read on y that was done by t1 is
conflicting with the write on y from t2 and the read on x by t2 is conflicting
with the write of x in the simulation of t1’s commit event. On the other hand,
the following execution of Write-Skew without the read on y in t1:
begin(p1, t1)st(p1, t1, rx, 1) st(p1, t1, x, rx)
begin(p2, t2)ld(p2, t2, x, 0)isu(p2, t2, y, 1)com(p2, t2)
misses the conflict (happens-before dependency) between the issue event of
t1 and t2. Therefore, the events of t2 can be reordered to the left of t1 and
obtain an equivalent execution where st(p1, t1, x, rx) occurs immediately after
st(p1, t1, rx, 1). In this case, t1 is not anymore delayed and this execution is
possible under serializability (without the instrumentation).
If the number of transactions to be delayed in order to expose an anomaly
is unbounded, the instrumentation described above may need an unbounded
number of auxiliary registers. This would make the verification problem hard
or even undecidable. However, we show that it is actually enough to delay a
single transaction, i.e., a program admits an anomaly under SI iff it admits
an anomaly containing a single delayed transaction. This result implies that
the number of auxiliary registers needed by the instrumentation is bounded
by the number of program variables, and that checking robustness against SI
can be reduced in linear time to a reachability problem under serializability
(the reachability problem encodes the existence of the chain of happens-before
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dependencies mentioned above). The proof of this reduction relies on a non-
trivial characterization of anomalies.
Proving robustness using commutativity dependency graphs. Based on
the reduction above, we also devise an approximated method for checking robust-
ness based on the concept of mover in Lipton’s reduction theory [17]. An event
is a left (resp., right) mover if it commutes to the left (resp., right) of another
event (from a different process) while preserving the computation. We use the
notion of mover to characterize happens-before dependencies between transac-
tions. Roughly, there exists a happens-before dependency between two transac-
tions in some execution if one doesn’t commute to the left/right of the other one.
We define a commutativity dependency graph which summarizes the happens-
before dependencies in all executions of a given program between transactions
t as they appear in the program, transactions t \ {w} where the writes of t are
t1
t2
t1 \ {r}
t2 \ {r}
t1 \ {w}
t2 \ {w}
Fig. 2: Commutativity dependency
graph of WS where the read of y is
omitted.
deactivated (i.e., their effects are not vis-
ible outside the transaction), and trans-
actions t \ {r} where the reads of t ob-
tain non-deterministic values. The trans-
actions t \ {w} are used to simulate is-
sue events of delayed transactions (where
writes are not yet visible) while the trans-
actions t\{r} are used to simulate commit
events of delayed transactions (which only
write to the shared memory). Two transactions a and b are linked by an edge
iff a cannot move to the right of b (or b cannot move to the left of a), or if
they are related by the program order (i.e., issued in some order in the same
process). Then a program is robust if for every transaction t, this graph doesn’t
contain a path from t \ {w} to t \ {r} formed of transactions that don’t write
to a variable that t writes to (the latter condition is enforced by SI since two
concurrent transactions cannot commit at the same time when they write to a
common variable). For example, Figure 2 shows the commutativity dependency
graph of the modified WS program where the read of y is removed from t1. The
fact that it doesn’t contain any path like above implies that it is robust.
3 Programs
A program is parallel composition of processes distinguished using a set of iden-
tifiers P. Each process is a sequence of transactions and each transaction is a
sequence of labeled instructions. Each transaction starts with a begin instruc-
tion and finishes with a commit instruction. Each other instruction is either an
assignment to a process-local register from a set R or to a shared variable from
a set V, or an assume statement. The read/write assignments use values from a
data domain D. An assignment to a register 〈reg〉 := 〈var〉 is called a read of the
shared-variable 〈var〉 and an assignment to a shared variable 〈var〉 := 〈reg-expr〉
is called a write to 〈var〉 (〈reg-expr〉 is an expression over registers whose syn-
tax we leave unspecified since it is irrelevant for our development). The assume
6 S.M. Beillahi, A. Bouajjani, and C. Enea.
〈bexpr〉 blocks the process if the Boolean expression 〈bexpr〉 over registers is
false. They are used to model conditionals as usual. We use goto statements to
model an arbitrary control-flow where the same label can be assigned to multi-
ple instructions and multiple goto statements can direct the control to the same
label which allows to mimic imperative constructs like loops and conditionals.
To simplify the technical exposition, our syntax includes simple read/write in-
structions. However, our results apply as well to instructions that include SQL
(select/update) queries. The experiments reported in Section 7 consider pro-
grams with SQL based transactions.
The semantics of a program under SI is defined as follows. The shared vari-
ables are stored in a central memory and each process keeps a replicated copy of
the central memory. A process starts a transaction by discarding its local copy
and fetching the values of the shared variables from the central memory. When
a process commits a transaction, it merges its local copy of the shared variables
with the one stored in the central memory in order to make its updates visible
to all processes. During the execution of a transaction, the process stores the
writes to shared variables only in its local copy and reads only from its local
copy. When a process merges its local copy with the centralized one, it is re-
quired that there were no concurrent updates that occurred after the last fetch
from the central memory to a shared variable that was updated by the current
transaction. Otherwise, the transaction is aborted and its effects discarded.
More precisely, the semantics of a program P under SI is defined as a labeled
transition system [P ]SI where transactions are labeled by the set of events
Ev = {begin(p, t), ld(p, t, x, v), isu(p, t, x, v), com(p, t) : p ∈ P, t ∈ T2, x ∈ V, v ∈ D}
where begin and com label transitions corresponding to the start and the com-
mit of a transaction, respectively. isu and ld label transitions corresponding to
writing, resp., reading, a shared variable during some transaction.
An execution of program P , under snapshot isolation, is a sequence of events
ev1 · ev2 · . . . corresponding to a run of [P ]CM. The set of executions of P under
SI is denoted by ExSI(P).
4 Robustness Against SI
A trace abstracts the order in which shared-variables are accessed inside a trans-
action and the order between transactions accessing different variables. Formally,
the trace of an execution ρ is obtained by (1) replacing each sub-sequence of
transitions in ρ corresponding to the same transaction, but excluding the com
transition, with a single “macro-event” isu(p, t), and (2) adding several standard
relations between these macro-events isu(p, t) and commit events com(p, t) to
record the data-flow in ρ, e.g. which transaction wrote the value read by an-
other transaction. The sequence of isu(p, t) and com(p, t) events obtained in the
first step is called a summary of ρ. We say that a transaction t in ρ performs
an external read of a variable x if ρ contains an event ld(p, t, x, v) which is not
preceded by a write on x of t, i.e., an event isu(p, t, x, v). Also, we say that a
transaction t writes a variable x if ρ contains an event isu(p, t, x, v), for some v.
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The trace tr(ρ) = (τ,PO,WR,WW,RW, STO) of an execution ρ consists of
the summary τ of ρ along with the program order PO, which relates any two
issue events isu(p, t) and isu(p, t′) that occur in this order in τ , write-read relation
WR (also called read-from), which relates any two events com(p, t) and isu(p′, t′)
that occur in this order in τ such that t′ performs an external read of x, and
com(p, t) is the last event in τ before isu(p′, t′) that writes to x (to mark the
variable x, we may use WR(x)), the write-write order WW (also called store-
order), which relates any two store events com(p, t) and com(p′, t′) that occur
in this order in τ and write to the same variable x (to mark the variable x, we
may use WW(x)), the read-write relation RW (also called conflict), which relates
any two events isu(p, t) and com(p′, t′) that occur in this order in τ such that t
reads a value that is overwritten by t′, and the same-transaction relation STO,
which relates the issue event with the commit event of the same transaction. The
read-write relation RW is formally defined as RW(x) = WR−1(x);WW(x) (we
use ; to denote the standard composition of relations) and RW =
⋃
x∈V
RW(x). If a
transaction t reads the initial value of x then RW(x) relates isu(p, t) to com(p′, t′)
of any other transaction t′ which writes to x (i.e., (isu(p, t), com(p′, t′)) ∈ RW(x))
(note that in the above relations, p and p′ might designate the same process).
Since we reason about only one trace at a time, to simplify the writing, we
may say that a trace is simply a sequence τ as above, keeping the relations PO,
WR, WW, RW, and STO implicit. The set of traces of executions of a program
P under SI is denoted by Tr(P)SI.
Serializability semantics. The semantics of a program under serializability
can be defined using a transition system where the configurations keep a single
shared-variable valuation (accessed by all processes) with the standard inter-
pretation of read and write statements. Each transaction executes in isolation.
Alternatively, the serializability semantics can be defined as a restriction of [P ]SI
to the set of executions where each transaction is immediately delivered when it
starts, i.e., the start and commit time of transaction coincide t.st = t.ct. Such ex-
ecutions are called serializable and the set of serializable executions of a program
P is denoted by ExSER(P). The latter definition is easier to reason about when
relating executions under snapshot isolation and serializability, respectively.
Serializable trace. A trace tr is called serializable if it is the trace of a se-
rializable execution. Let TrSER(P) denote the set of serializable traces. Given
a serializable trace tr = (τ,PO,WR,WW,RW, STO) we have that every event
isu(p, t) in τ is immediately followed by the corresponding com(p, t) event.
Happens before order. Since multiple executions may have the same trace,
it is possible that an execution ρ produced by snapshot isolation has a serial-
izable trace tr(ρ) even though isu(p, t) events may not be immediately followed
by com(p, t) actions. However, ρ would be equivalent, up to reordering of “in-
dependent” (or commutative) transitions, to a serializable execution. To check
whether the trace of an execution is serializable, we introduce the happens-before
relation on the events of a given trace as the transitive closure of the union of
all the relations in the trace, i.e., HB = (PO ∪WW ∪WR ∪ RW ∪ STO)+.
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Finally, the happens-before relation between events is extended to transac-
tions as follows: a transaction t1 happens-before another transaction t2 6= t1 if the
trace tr contains an event of transaction t1 which happens-before an event of t2.
The happens-before relation between transactions is denoted by HBt and called
transactional happens-before. The following characterizes serializable traces.
Theorem 1 ([1, 22]). A trace tr is serializable iff HBt is acyclic.
A program is called robust if it produces the same set of traces as the seri-
alizability semantics.
Definition 1. A program P is called robust against SI iff TrSI(P) = TrSER(P).
Since TrSER(P) ⊆ TrX(P), the problem of checking robustness of a program P is
reduced to checking whether there exists a trace tr ∈ TrSI(P) \ TrSER(P).
5 Reducing Robustness against SI to SC Reachability
A trace which is not serializable must contain at least an issue and a commit
event of the same transaction that don’t occur one after the other even after
reordering of “independent” events. Thus, there must exist an event that occur
between the two which is related to both events via the happens-before relation,
forbidding the issue and commit to be adjacent. Otherwise, we can build an-
other trace with the same happens-before where events are reordered such that
the issue is immediately followed by the corresponding commit. The latter is a
serializable trace which contradicts the initial assumption. We define a program
instrumentation which mimics the delay of transactions by doing the writes on
auxiliary variables which are not visible to other transactions. After the delay of
a transaction, we track happens-before dependencies until we execute a trans-
action that does a “read” on one of the variables that the delayed transaction
writes to (this would expose a read-write dependency to the commit event of
the delayed transaction). While tracking happens-before dependencies we can-
not execute a transaction that writes to a variable that the delayed transaction
writes to since SI forbids write-write conflicts between concurrent transactions.
Concretely, given a program P , we define an instrumentation of P such that
P is not robust against SI iff the instrumentation reaches an error state under
serializability. The instrumentation uses auxiliary variables in order to simu-
late a single delayed transaction which we prove that it is enough for deciding
robustness. Let isu(p, t) be the issue event of the only delayed transaction. The
process p that delayed t is called the Attacker. When the attacker finishes execut-
ing the delayed transaction it stops. Other processes that execute transactions
afterwards are called Happens-Before Helpers.
The instrumentation uses two copies of the set of shared variables in the
original program to simulate the delayed transaction. We use primed variables
x′ to denote the second copy. Thus, when a process becomes the attacker, it will
only write to the second copy that is not visible to other processes including the
happens-before helpers. The writes made by the other processes including the
happens-before helpers are made visible to all processes.
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When the attacker delays the transaction t, it keeps track of the variables
it accessed, in particular, it stores the name of one of the variables it writes
to, x, it tracks every variable y that it reads from and every variable z that it
writes to. When the attacker finishes executing t, and some other process wants
to execute some other transaction, the underlying transaction must contain a
write to a variable y that the attacker reads from. Also, the underlying trans-
action must not write to a variable that t writes to. We say that this process
has joined happens-before helpers through the underlying transaction. While
executing this transaction, we keep track of each variable that was accessed and
the type of operation, wheather it is a read or write. Afterward, in order for
some other transaction to “join” the happens-before path, it must not write to
a variable that t writes to so it does not violate the fact that SI forbids write-
write conflicts, and it has to satisfy one of the following conditions in order to
ensure the continuity of the happens-before dependencies: (1) the transaction is
issued by a process that has already another transaction in the happens-before
dependency (program order dependency), (2) the transaction is reading from a
shared variable that was updated by a previous transaction in the happens-before
dependency (write-read dependency), (3) the transaction writes to a shared vari-
able that was read by a previous transaction in the happens-before dependency
(read-write dependency), or (4) the transaction writes to a shared variable that
was updated by a previous transaction in the happens-before dependency (write-
write dependency). We introduce a flag for each shared variable to mark the fact
that the variable was read or written by a previous transaction.
Processes continue executing transactions as part of the chain of happens-
before dependencies, until a transaction does a read on the variable x that t
wrote to. In this case, we reached an error state which signals that we found a
cycle in the transactional happens-before relation.
The instrumentation uses four varieties of flags: a) global flags (i.e., HB, atrA ,
astA), b) flags local to a process (i.e., p.a and p.hbh), and c) flags per shared
variable (i.e., x.event, x.event′, and x.eventI). We will explain the meaning of
these flags along with the instrumentation. At the start of the execution, all flags
are initialized to null (⊥).
Whether a process is an attacker or happens-before helper is not enforced
syntactically by the instrumentation. It is set non-deterministically during the
execution using some additional process-local flags. Each process chooses to set
to true at most one of the flags p.a and p.hbh, implying that the process becomes
an attacker or happens-before helper, respectively. At most one process can be
an attacker, i.e., set p.a to true. In the following, we detail the instrumentation
for read and write instructions of the attacker and happens-before helpers.
5.1 Instrumentation of the Attacker
Figure 3 lists the instrumentation of the write and read instructions of the at-
tacker. Each process passes through an initial phase where it executes transac-
tions that are visible immediately to all the other processes (i.e., they are not
delayed), and then non-deterministically it can choose to delay a transaction at
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[[l1: r := x; goto l2;]]A =
// Read before the delayed transaction
l1: assume atrA =⊥ ; goto lx1;
lx1: r := x; goto l2;
// Read in the delayed transaction
l1: assume atrA 6=⊥ ∧p.a 6=⊥ ; goto lx2;
lx2: r := x
′
; goto lx3;
lx3: x.event := ld; goto lx4; (1)
lx4: assume HB =⊥ ; goto lx5;
lx5: HB := true; goto l2; (2)
lx4: assume HB 6=⊥ ; goto l2;
[[l1: x := e; goto l2;]]A =
// Write before the delayed transaction
l1: assume atrA =⊥ ; goto lx1;
lx1: x := e; goto l2;
// Write in the delayed transaction
l1: assume atrA 6=⊥ ∧p.a 6=⊥ ; goto lx2;
lx2: x
′ := e; goto lx3; (3)
lx3: x.event
′ := 1; goto l2; (4)
// Special write in the delayed transaction
l1: assume astA = x.event =⊥ ∧ atrA 6=⊥ ; goto lx4;
lx4: x
′ := e; goto lx5;
lx5: astA := ‘x‘; goto lx6; (5)
lx8: x.event
′ := 1; goto l2;
Fig. 3: Instrumentation of the Attacker. We use ‘x‘ to denote the name of the
shared variable x.
which point it sets the flag atrA to true. During the delayed transaction it chooses
non-deterministically a write instruction to a variable x and stores the name of
this variable in the flag astA (line (5)). The values written during the delayed
transaction are stored in the primed variables and are visible only to the current
transaction, in case the transaction reads its own writes. For example, given a
variable z, all writes to z from the original program are transformed into writes
to the primed version z′ (line (3)). Each time, the attacker writes to z, it sets
the flag z.event′ = 1. This flag is used later by transactions from happens-before
helpers to avoid writing to variables that the delayed transaction writes to.
A read on a variable, y, in the delayed transaction takes her value from
the primed version, y′. In every read in the delayed transaction, we set the flag
y.event to ld (line (1)) to be used latter in order for a process to join the happens-
before helpers. Afterward, the attacker starts the happens-before path, and it
sets the variable HB to true (line (2)) to mark the start of the happens. When
the flag HB is set to true the attacker stops executing new transactions.
5.2 Instrumentation of the Happens-Before Helpers
The remaining processes, which are not the attacker, can become a happens-
before helper. Figure 4 lists the instrumentation of write and read instructions of
a happens-before helper. In a first phase, each process executes the original code
until the flag atrA is set to true by the attacker. This flag signals the “creation”
of the secondary copy of the shared-variables, which can be observed only by
the attacker. At this point, the flag HB is set to true, and the happens-before
helper process chooses non-deterministically a first transaction through which it
wants to join the set of happens-before helpers, i.e., continue the happens-before
dependency created by the existing happens-before helpers. When a process
chooses a transaction, it makes a pledge (while executing the begin instruction)
that during this transaction it will either read from a variable that was written to
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by another happens-before helper, write to a variable that was accessed (read or
written) by another happens-before helper, or write to a variable that was read
from in the delayed transaction. When the pledge is met, the process sets the
flag p.hbh to true (lines (7) and (11)). The execution is blocked if a process does
not keep its pledge (i.e., the flag p.hbh is null) at the end of the transaction.
Note that the first process to join the happens-before helper has to execute
a transaction t which writes to a variable that was read from in the delayed
transaction since this is the only way to build a happens-before between t, and
the delayed transaction (PO is not possible since t is not from the attacker, WR
is not possible since t does not see the writes of the delayed transaction, andWW
is not possible since t cannot write to a variable that the delayed transaction
writes to). We use a flag x.event for each variable x to record the type (read ld
or write st) of the last access made by a happens-before helper (lines (8) and
(10)). During the execution of a transaction that is part of the happens-before
dependency, we must ensure that the transaction does not write to variable y
where y.even′ is set to 1. Otherwise, the execution is blocked (line 9).
The happens-before helpers continue executing their instructions, until one
of them reads from the shared variable x whose name was stored in astA . This
establishes a happens-before dependency between the delayed transaction and
a “fictitious” store event corresponding to the delayed transaction that could
be executed just after this read of x. The execution doesn’t have to contain
this store event explicitly since it is always enabled. Therefore, at the end of
every transaction, the instrumentation checks whether the transaction read x.
If it is the case, then the execution stops and goes to an error state to indicate
that this is a robustness violation. Notice that after the attacker stops, the only
processes that are executing transactions are happens-before helpers, which is
justified since when a process is not from a happens-before helper it implies
that we cannot construct a happens-before dependency between a transaction of
this process and the delayed transaction which means that the two transactions
commute which in turn implies that this process’s transactions can be executed
before executing the delayed transaction of the attacker.
5.3 Correctness
The role of a process in an execution is chosen non-deterministically at runtime.
Therefore, the final instrumentation of a given program P , denoted by [[P ]], is
obtained by replacing each labeled instruction 〈linst〉 with the concatenation
of the instrumentations corresponding to the attacker and the happens-before
helpers, i.e., [[〈linst〉]] ::= [[〈linst〉]]A [[〈linst〉]]HbH
The following theorem states the correctness of the instrumentation.
Theorem 2. P is not robust against SI iff [[P ]] reaches the error state.
If a program is not robust, this implies that the execution of the program under
SI results in a trace where the happens-before is cyclic. Which is possible only
if the program contains at least one delayed transaction. In the proof of this
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[[l1: r := x; goto l2;]]HbH =
// Read before the delayed transaction
l1: assume HB =⊥ ∧p.a =⊥ ; goto lx1;
lx1: r := x; goto l2; (6)
// Read after the delayed transaction
l1: assume HB 6=⊥ ; goto lx2;
lx2: r := x; goto lx3;
lx3: assume x.eventI = st ∧ p.hbh =⊥ ; goto lx4;
lx4: p.hbh := true; goto l2; (7)
lx3: assume x.event =⊥ ; goto lx5;
lx5: x.event := ld; goto l2; (8)
lx3: assume x.event 6=⊥ ∨ p.hbh 6=⊥ ; goto l2;
[[l1: x := e; goto l2;]]HbH =
// Write before the delayed transaction
l1: assume HB =⊥ ∧ atrA =⊥ ; goto lx1;
lx1: x := e; goto l2;
// Write after the delayed transaction
l1: assume HB 6=⊥ ∧p.a =⊥ ; goto lx2;
lx2: assume x.event
′
6=⊥ ; assume false; (9)
lx2: assume x.event
′ =⊥ ; goto lx3;
lx3: x := e; goto lx4;
lx4: x.event := st; goto lx5; (10)
lx5: assume x.eventI 6=⊥ ∧ p.hbh =⊥ ; goto lx6;
lx6: p.hbh := true; goto l2; (11)
lx5: assume x.eventI =⊥ ∨ p.hbh 6=⊥ ; goto l2;
Fig. 4: Instrumentation of Happens-Before Helpers.
theorem, we show that is sufficient to search for executions that contain a single
delayed transaction.
Notice that in the instrumentation of the attacker, the delayed transaction
must contain a read and write instructions on different variables. Also, the trans-
actions of the happens-before helpers must not contain a write to a variable that
the delayed transaction writes to. The following corollary states the complexity
of checking robustness for finite-state programs 1 against snapshot isolation. It is
a direct consequence of Theorem 2 and of previous results concerning the reach-
ability problem in concurrent programs running over a sequentially-consistent
memory, with a fixed [16] or parametric number of processes [21].
Corollary 1. Checking robustness of finite-state programs against snapshot iso-
lation is PSPACE-complete when the number of processes is fixed and
EXPSPACE-complete, otherwise.
The instrumentation can be extended to SQL (select/update) queries where a
statement may include expressions over a finite/infinite set of variables, e.g., by
manipulating a set of flags x.event for each statement instead of only one.
6 Proving Program Robustness
As a more pragmatic alternative to the reduction in the previous section, we
define an approximated method for proving robustness which is inspired by Lip-
ton’s reduction theory [17].
Movers.Given an execution τ = ev1·. . .·evn of a programP under serializability
(where each event ev i corresponds to executing an entire transaction), we say
that the event ev i moves right (resp., left) in τ if ev1 ·. . . ·ev i−1 ·ev i+1 ·ev i ·ev i+2 ·
. . .·evn (resp., ev1 ·. . .·ev i−2 ·ev i ·ev i−1 ·ev i+1 ·. . .·evn) is also a valid execution of
P , the process of ev i is different from the process of ev i+1 (resp., ev i−1), and both
1 Programs with a bounded number of variables taking values from a bounded domain.
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executions reach to the same end state σn. For an execution τ , let instOfτ (ev i)
denote the transaction that generated the event ev i. A transaction t of a program
P is a right (resp., left) mover if for all executions τ of P under serializability,
the event ev i with instOf(ev i) = t moves right (resp., left) in τ .
If a transaction t is not a right mover, then there must exist an execution τ of
P under serializability and an event ev i of τ with instOf(ev i) = t that does not
move right. This implies that there must exist another ev i+1 of τ which caused
ev i to not be a right mover. Since ev i and ev i+1 do not commute, then this
must be because of either a write-read, write-write, or a read-write dependency.
If t′ = instOf(ev i+1), we say that t is not a right mover because of t
′ and some
dependency that is either write-read, write-write, or read-write. Notice that when
t is not a right mover because of t′ then t′ is not a left mover because of t.
We define MWR as a binary relation between transactions such that (t, t
′) ∈
MWR when t is not a right mover because of t
′ and a write-read dependency. We
define the relations MWW and MRW corresponding to write-write and read-write
dependencies in a similar way.
Read/Write-free transactions. Given a transaction t, we define t \ {r} as a
variation of t where all the reads from shared variables are replaced with non-
deterministic reads, i.e., 〈reg〉 := 〈var〉 statements are replaced with 〈reg〉 := ⋆
where ⋆ denotes non-deterministic choice. We also define t\{w} as a variation of
t where all the writes to shared variables in t are disabled. Intuitively, recalling
the reduction to SC reachability in Section 5, t \ {w} simulates the delay of
a transaction by the Attacker, i.e., the writes are not made visible to other
processes, and t\{r} approximates the commit of the delayed transaction which
only applies a set of writes.
Commutativity dependency graph. Given a program P , we define the com-
mutativity dependency graph as a graph where vertices represent transactions
and their read/write-free variations. Two vertices which correspond to the orig-
inal transactions in P are related by a program order edge, if they belong to the
same process. The other edges in this graph represent the “non-mover” relations
MWR, MWW, and MRW.
Given a program P , we say that the commutativity dependency graph of P
contains a non-mover cycle if there exist a set of transactions t0, t1, . . . , tn of P
such that the following hold:
(a) (t′′0 , t1) ∈ MRW where t
′′
0 is the write-free variation of t0 and t1 does not write
to a variable that t0 writes to;
(b) for all i ∈ [1, n], (ti, ti+1) ∈ (PO ∪MWR ∪MWW ∪MRW), ti and ti+1 do not
write to a shared variable that t0 writes to;
(c) (tn, t
′
0) ∈ MRW where t
′
0 is the read-free variation of t0 and tn does not write
to a variable that t0 writes to.
A non-mover cycle approximates an execution of the instrumentation defined
in Section 5 in between the moment that the Attacker delays a transaction t0
(which here corresponds to the write-free variation t′′0) and the moment where
t0 gets committed (the read-free variation t
′
0).
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The following theorem shows that the acyclicity of the commutativity de-
pendency graph of a program implies the robustness of the program. Actually,
the notion of robustness in this theorem relies on a slightly different notion of
trace where store-order and write-order dependencies take into account values,
i.e., store-order relates only writes writing different values and the write-order
relates a read to the oldest write (w.r.t. execution order) writing its value. This
relaxation helps in avoiding some harmless robustness violations due to for in-
stance, two transactions writing the same value to some variable.
Theorem 3. For a program P, if the commutativity dependency graph of P does
not contain non-mover cycles, then P is robust.
7 Experiments
To test the applicability of our robustness checking algorithms, we have con-
sidered a benchmark of 10 applications extracted from the literature related
to weakly consistent databases in general. A first set of applications are open
source projects that were implemented to be run over the Cassandra database,
extracted from [10]. The second set of applications is composed of: TPC-C [23],
an on-line transaction processing benchmark widely used in the database com-
munity, SmallBank, a simplified representation of a banking application [2], Fu-
sionTicket, a movie ticketing application [15], Auction, an online auction appli-
cation [5], and Courseware, a course registration service extracted from [13, 18].
A first experiment concerns the reduction of robustness checking to SC reach-
ability. For each application, we have constructed a client (i.e., a program com-
posed of transactions defined within that application) with a fixed number of
processes (at most 3) and a fixed number of transactions (between 3 and 7
transactions per process). We have encoded the instrumentation of this client,
defined in Section 5, in the Boogie programming language [3] and used the Civl
verifier [14] in order to check whether the assertions introduced by the instru-
mentation are violated (which would represent a robustness violation). Note
that since clients are of fixed size, this requires no additional assertions/invari-
ants (it is an instance of bounded model checking). The results are reported in
Table 1. We have found two of the applications, Courseware and SmallBank, to
not be robust against snapshot isolation. The violation in Courseware is caused
by transactions RemoveCourse and EnrollStudent that execute concurrently,
RemoveCourse removing a course that has no registered student and EnrollStu-
dent registering a new student to the same course. We get an invalid state where
a student is registered for a course that was removed. SmallBank’s violation
contains transactions Balance, TransactSaving, and WriteCheck. One process
executes WriteCheck where it withdraws an amount from the checking account
after checking that the sum of the checking and savings accounts is bigger than
this amount. Concurrently, a second process executes TransactSaving where it
withdraws an amount from the saving account after checking that it is smaller
than the amount in the savings account. Afterwards, the second process checks
the contents of both the checking and saving accounts. We get an invalid state
where the sum of the checking and savings accounts is negative.
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Table 1: An overview of the analysis results. CDG stands for commutativity de-
pendency graph. The columns PO and PT show the number of proof obligations
and proof time in second, respectively. T stands for trivial when the application
has only read-only transactions.
Application #Transactions Robustness Reachability Analysis CDG Analysis
PO PT PO PT
Auction 4 ✓ 70 0.3 20 0.5
Courseware 5 ✗ 59 0.37 na na
FusionTicket 4 ✓ 72 0.3 34 0.5
SmallBank 5 ✗ 48 0.28 na na
TPC-C 5 ✓ 54 0.7 82 3.7
Cassieq-Core 8 ✓ 173 0.55 104 2.9
Currency-Exchange 6 ✓ 88 0.35 26 3.5
PlayList 14 ✓ 99 4.63 236 7.3
RoomStore 5 ✓ 85 0.3 22 0.5
Shopping-Cart 4 ✓ 58 0.25 T T
Since in the first experiment we consider fixed clients, the lack of asser-
tion violations doesn’t imply that the application is robust (this instantiation
of our reduction can only be used to reveal robustness violations). Thus, a sec-
ond experiment concerns the robustness proof method based on commutativity
dependency graphs (Section 6). For the applications that were not identified as
non-robust by the previous method, we have used Civl to construct their com-
mutativity dependency graphs, i.e., identify the “non-mover” relations MWR,
MWW, and MRW (Civl allows to check whether some code fragment is a left-
/right mover). In all cases, the graph didn’t contain non-mover cycles, which
allows to conclude that the applications are robust.
The experiments show that our results can be used for finding violations and
proving robustness, and that they apply to a large set of interesting examples.
Note that the reduction to SC and the proof method based on commutativity
dependency graphs are valid for programs with SQL (select/update) queries.
8 Related Work
Decidability and complexity of robustness has been investigated in the context
of relaxed memory models such as TSO and Power [6, 8, 12]. Our work borrows
some high-level principles from [6] which addresses the robustness against TSO.
We reuse the high-level methodology of characterizing minimal violations accord-
ing to some measure and defining reductions to SC reachability using a program
instrumentation. Instantiating this methodology in our context is however very
different, several fundamental differences being:
– SI and TSO admit different sets of relaxations and SI is a model of trans-
actional databases.
– We use a different notion of measure: the measure in [6] counts the number of
events between a write issue and a write commit while our notion of measure
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counts the number of delayed transactions. This is a first reason for which
the proof techniques in [6] don’t extend to our context.
– Transactions induce more complex traces: two transactions might be related
by several dependency relations since each transaction may contain multiple
reads and writes to different locations. In TSO, each action is a read or a write
to some location, and two events are related by a single dependency relation.
Also, the number of dependencies between two transactions depends on the
execution since the set of reads/writes in a transaction evolves dynamically.
Other works [8, 12] define decision procedures which are based on the theory of
regular languages and do not extend to infinite-state programs like in our case.
p1:
t1: [ if (x > y)
r1 = x - y
x = y ]
||
p2:
t2: [ if (y > x)
r2 = y - x
y = x ]
Fig. 5: A robust program.
As far as we know, our work provides
the first results concerning the decidability
and the complexity of robustness checking
in the context of transactions. The existing
work on the verification of robustness for
transactional programs provide either over-
or under-approximate analyses. Our commutativity dependency graphs are sim-
ilar to the static dependency graphs used in [5, 9, 10, 11], but they are more
precise, i.e., reducing the number of false alarms. The static dependency graphs
record happens-before dependencies between transactions based on a syntactic
approximation of the variables accessed by a transaction. For example, our tech-
niques are able to prove that the program in Figure 5 is robust, while this is not
possible using static dependency graphs. The latter would contain a dependency
from transaction t1 to t2 and one from t2 to t1 just because syntactically, each
of the two transactions reads both variables and may write to one of them. Our
dependency graphs take into account the semantics of these transactions and do
not include this happens-before cycle. Other over- and under-approximate anal-
yses have been proposed in [19]. They are based on encoding executions into first
order logic, bounded-model checking for the under-approximate analysis, and a
sound check for proving a cut-off bound on the size of the happens-before cycles
possible in the executions of a program, for the over-approximate analysis. The
latter is strictly less precise than our method based on commutativity depen-
dency graphs. For instance, extending the TPC-C application with additional
transactions will make the method in [19] fail while our method will succeed in
proving robustness (the three transactions are for adding a new product, adding
a new warehouse based on the number of customers and warehouses, and adding
a new customer, respectively).
Finally, the idea of using Lipton’s reduction theory for checking robustness
has been also used in the context of the TSO memory model [7], but the tech-
niques are completely different, e.g., the TSO technique considers each update
in isolation and doesn’t consider non-mover cycles like in our commutativity
dependency graphs.
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A Programs
A.1 Program Syntax
We consider a simple programming language grammar which is defined in Fig-
ure 6. A program is parallel composition of processes distinguished using a set of
identifiers P. Each process is a sequence of transactions and each transaction is
a sequence of labeled instructions. Each transaction starts with a begin instruc-
tion and finishes with a commit instruction. Each other instruction is either an
assignment to a process-local register from a set R or to a shared variable from
a set V, or an assume statement. The read/write assignments use values from
a data domain D. An assignment to a register 〈reg〉 := 〈var〉 is called a read
of 〈var〉 and an assignment to a shared variable 〈var〉 := 〈reg-expr〉 is called a
write to 〈var〉 (〈reg-expr〉 is an expression over registers whose syntax we leave
unspecified since it is irrelevant for our development). The assume 〈bexpr〉 blocks
the process if the Boolean expression 〈bexpr〉 over registers is false.
〈prog〉 ::= program 〈process〉∗
〈process〉 ::= process 〈pid〉 regs 〈reg〉∗
〈ltxn〉∗
〈ltxn〉 ::= 〈binst〉 〈linst〉∗ 〈einst〉
〈binst〉 ::= 〈label〉: begin; goto 〈label〉;
〈einst〉 ::= 〈label〉: end; goto 〈label〉;
〈linst〉 ::= 〈label〉: 〈inst〉; goto 〈label〉;
〈inst〉 ::= 〈reg〉 := 〈var〉
| 〈var〉 := 〈reg-expr〉
| assume 〈bexpr〉
Fig. 6: Program syntax. a∗ indicates zero or more occurrences of a. 〈pid〉, 〈reg〉,
〈label〉, and 〈var〉 represent a process identifier, a register, a label, and a shared
variable, respectively. 〈reg-expr〉 is an expression over registers while 〈bexpr〉 is
a Boolean expression over registers.
A.2 Program Semantics Under SnapShot Isolation
The semantics of a program under SI is defined as follows. The shared variables
are stored in a central memory and each process keeps a replicated copy of the
central memory. A process starts a transaction by discarding its local copy and
fetching the values of the shared variables from the central memory. When a
process commits a transaction, it merges its local copy of the shared variables
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with the one stored in the central memory in order to make its updates visible
to all processes. During the execution of a transaction, the process stores the
writes to shared variables only in its local copy and reads only from its local
copy. When a process merges its local copy with the centralized one, it is required
that there were no concurrent updates that occurred after the last fetch from the
central memory to a shared variable that was updated by the current transaction.
Otherwise, the transaction is aborted and its effects discarded.
Thus, a program configuration is a tuple gs = (ls, tstamp, Log) where ls :
P → S associates a local state in S to each process in P, tstamp : V → T stores
the largest timestamp for each shared variable, and Log : V → D holds the
global valuation of shared variables. A local state is a tuple 〈pc, store, log, rval〉
where pc ∈ Lab is the program counter, i.e., the label of the next instruction
to be executed, store : V → D is the local valuation of the shared variables,
log : V→ {⊥, 1} is a local log which marks shared variables which were updated
in a transaction, and rval : R → D is the valuation of the local registers. For a
local state s, we use s.pc to denote the program counter component of s, and
similarly for all the other components of s. Given a transaction t ∈ T×T, we use
t.st to denote the start time of transaction t and t.ct to denote the commit time
of t. Before merging store with Log, after executing a transaction t, we check that
for every variable x that t writes to (log(x) 6= ⊥) we have that tstamp(x) < t.st
(i.e., there were no concurrent write to x). Then, we store the value of store(x)
for every variable x that t writes to (log(x) 6= ⊥) in Log(x). Also, for every
variable x that t writes to, we store t.ct in tstamp(x).
Then, the semantics of a program P under snapshot isolation consistency
model is defined using a labeled transition system (LTS) [P ]SI = (C,Ev, gs0,→)
where C is the set of program configurations, Ev is a set of transition labels
called events, gs0 is the initial program configuration, and→⊆ C×Ev×C is the
transition relation. The set of events under SI is defined as follow.
Ev = { begin(p, t), ld(p, t, x, v), isu(p, t, x, v), com(p, t) : p ∈ P, t ∈ T× T, x ∈ V, v ∈ D}
where begin and com label transitions corresponding to the start and the com-
mit of a transaction, respectively. isu and ld label transitions corresponding to
writing, resp., reading, a shared variable during some transaction.
The transition relation → is defined in Figure 7. For readability, the events
labeling a transition are written on top of →. A begin transition resets the
local valuation of the shared variables and fetches their values from the central
memory. A com transition applies the writes performed in a transaction to the
central memory by merging the contents of the local copy store with the central
memory Log. An ld transition reads the value of a shared-variable from the local
copy store while an isu transition applies a new write to the local copy store.
An execution of program P , under snapshot isolation, is a sequence of events
ev1 · ev2 · . . . labeling the transitions, such that there exists a sequence of con-
figurations gs0 · gs1 · . . . where gs0 is the initial configuration before P starts
execution and gsi−1
evi−−→ gsi is a valid transition for i > 1. of transitions. The
set of executions of P under SI is denoted by ExSI(P).
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begin ∈ inst(ls(p).pc) img(ls.tstamp) < t.st s = ls(p)[log 7→ ǫ, store 7→ Log, pc 7→ next(pc)]
(ls, tstamp, Log, lk)
begin(p, t)
−−−−−→ (ls[p 7→ s], tstamp, Log, lk)
r := x ∈ inst(ls(p).pc) ls(p).store[x] = v rval = ls(p).rval[r 7→ v]
s = ls(p)[rval 7→ rval , pc 7→ next(pc)]
(ls, tstamp, Log, lk)
ld(p, t, x, v)
−−−−−−−→ (ls[p 7→ s], tstamp, Log, lk)
x := v ∈ inst(ls(p).pc) log = ls(p).log[x 7→ 1] store = ls(p).store[x 7→ v]
s = ls(p)[log 7→ log, store 7→ store , pc 7→ next(pc)]
(ls, tstamp, Log, lk)
isu(p, t, x, v)
−−−−−−−→ (ls[p 7→ s], tstamp, Log, lk)
end ∈ inst(ls(p).pc) ∀x ∈ V. log[x] = ⊥ ∨ tstamp(x) < t.st img(ls.tstamp) < t.ct
Log = Log[x 7→ store[x] : x ∈ V, log [x] 6= ⊥]
tstamp = tstamp[x 7→ st.ct : x ∈ V, log [x] 6= ⊥] s = ls(p)[pc 7→ next(pc)]
(ls, tstamp, Log, lk)
com(p, t)
−−−−−→ (ls[p 7→ s], Log 7→ Log , tstamp 7→ tstamp , lk)
Fig. 7: The set of transition rules defining snapshot isolation semantics model.
We assume that all the events which come from the same transaction use a
unique transaction identifier t : (st, ct) that has two components. For a function
f , we use f [a 7→ b] to denote a function g such that g(c) = f(c) for all c 6= a and
g(a) = b. The function inst returns the set of instructions labeled by some given
label while next gives the next instruction to execute.
B Proofs of Section 5: Characterizations of SI
Trace-Robustness
In this section, we describe the proof of Theorem 2.We first reduce the robustness
of a program P against SI to the existence of some execution trace tr ∈ TrSI(P)\
TrSER(P) that has a specific shape. We call a trace tr ∈ TrSI(P) \ TrSER(P), an
anomaly. Then, we show that of the anomaly of a particular shape is equivalent
to an execution of the instrumented program reaching an error state.
First, we give an auxiliary lemma about the happens-before relation (between
events). In the remaining of this section, we use HB1 to denote the happens-
before without the transitive closure, i.e., HB1 = (PO∪WW∪WR∪RW∪STO).
To decide if two events in a trace are “independent” (or commutative) we use
the information about the existence of a happens-before relation between the
events. If two events are not related by happens-before then they can be swapped
while preserving the same happens-before. Thus, we extend the happens-before
relation to obtain the happens-before through relation as follows:
Definition 2 ([6]). Let τ = α · a · β · b · γ be a trace where a and b are events
(or atomic macro events), and α, β, and γ are sequences of events (or atomic
macro events) under a semantics SI. We say that a happens-before b through
β if there is a non empty sub-sequence c1 · · · cn of β that satisfies:
ci →HB1 ci+1 for all i ∈ [0, n]
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where c0 = a, cn+1 = b.
We deduce from the definition of serializable traces, that a anomaly trace
must contain at least an issue and a commit events of the same transaction that
are related via the happens-before through relation. Otherwise, we can build
another trace with the same happens-before where events are reordered such
that every issue isu(p, t) is immediately followed by the corresponding commit
com(p, t). The latter is a serializable trace which contradicts the initial assump-
tion.
Lemma 1. Given an anomaly τ , there must exist a transaction t such that
τ = α · isu(p, t) · β · com(p, t) · γ and isu(p, t) happens before com(p, t) through β.
Given an anomaly of the from τ = α·isu(p, t)·β ·com(p, t)·γ, we call t a delayed
transaction in the trace τ when isu(p, t) happens before com(p, t) through β.
For an anomaly τ , the number of delays, denoted by #(τ), in τ is the total
number of delayed transactions in the trace.
#(τ) = #t is a delayed transaction in τ t
Definition 3 (Minimal anomaly). An anomaly τ is called minimal if it has
the least number of delays among all possible anomalies (for a given program P).
Given an anomaly τ = α · isu(p, t) ·β · com(p, t) ·γ, and assuming that t is the
first delayed transaction in τ (w.r.t. the order between issue events of delayed
transactions) and that τ is a minimal anomaly, the following lemma shows that
we can assume w.l.o.g. that γ is empty.
Lemma 2. Let τ = α · isu(p, t) ·β · com(p, t) · γ be a minimal anomaly such that
isu(p, t) happens-before com(p, t) through β. Then, τ ′ = α · isu(p, t) · β · com(p, t)
is also a minimal anomaly.
Proof. We can notice that after executing the event com(p, t), we obtain a cycle
in the HBt relation. Thus, τ
′ is already an anomaly not serializable.
The following result relates SI robustness problem to finding certain anomaly
trace which is a minimal anomaly where only a single transaction is delayed.
Theorem 4. A program P is not robust under SI iff there exists an anomaly τ
under SI such that the following must hold:
τ = α · isu(p, t) · β · com(p, t) where:
(a) isu(p, t) is the issue of the only delayed transaction in τ ; (Lemmas 6 and 5);
(b) isu(p, t) happens before com(p, t) through β (Lemma 6);
(c) for any event a ∈ β, we have that (isu(p, t), a) ∈ HB and (a, com(p, t)) ∈ HB
(Lemma 6);
(d) there exist events a and b in β such that (isu(p, t), a) ∈ RW(x) and (b, com(p, t)) ∈
RW(y) with x 6= y (Lemma 6);
(e) all delayed transactions in β don’t write to shared variables that t writes to
(Lemma 3).
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isu(p1, t1) (p2, t2) del(p1, t1)
RW RW
(a) Anomaly trace of WS program.
isu(p3, t3) (p1, t1) (p2, t2) del(p3, t3)
RW WR RW
(b) Anomaly trace of RWC program.
Fig. 8: (a) Corresponds to an anomaly pattern where β = (p2, t2), t corresponds
to t1, and a = b = (p2, t2). Also (b) Corresponds to an anomaly pattern where
β = (p1, t1) · (p2, t2), t corresponds to t1, and a and b correspond to (p1, t1) and
(p2, t2), respectively.
Note that in certain cases the events a and b can be identical and β = a.
Figure 8 shows two examples of anomalies of the form given in Theorem 4.
In the following, we give the lemmas that constitute Theorem 4.
An important property in SI semantics is that of conflict-free, and since the
event com(p, t) is successfully executed only if there are no concurrent writes that
were committed after isu(p, t). Thus, for every event com(p0, t0) in β, com(p0, t0)
don’t write to a shared variable that com(p, t) writes to.
Lemma 3. Let τ = α · isu(p, t) · β · com(p, t) be a minimal anomaly such that
isu(p, t) happens-before com(p, t) through β. Then, for every a ∈ β, a does not
write to a shared variable that com(p, t) writes to.
The following lemma shows that we must have an event isu(p′, t′) ∈ β such
that isu(p′, t′) happens before com(p, t).
Lemma 4. Let τ = α · isu(p, t) · β · com(p, t) be a minimal anomaly such that
isu(p, t) happens-before com(p, t) through β. Then, there must exist an event
isu(p′, t′) ∈ β such that isu(p′, t′) happens before com(p, t), i.e., (isu(p′, t′), com(p, t)) ∈
HB.
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that β does not contain an event isu(p′, t′) such
that isu(p′, t′) happens before com(p, t). Then, com(p, t) can be swapped with
every isu(p′, t′) event in β. Thus, we obtain that the two events isu(p, t) and
com(p, t) are adjacent which means that t is no longer a delayed transaction
which is a contradiction. Therefore, β does contain an event isu(p′, t′) such that
(isu(p′, t′), com(p, t)) ∈ HB.
Next lemma shows that we can always obtain a minimal anomaly trace τ =
α · isu(p, t) · β · com(p, t) where β contains no delayed transaction. We show that
if it were to have a delayed transaction t0 in β, then it is possible to obtain a
new anomaly where either t is not delayed or t0 is not delayed, and obtain a new
anomaly with a smaller number of delayed transactions which contradicts the
minimality assumption.
Lemma 5. Let τ = α · isu(p, t) · β · com(p, t) be a minimal anomaly. Then, β
does not contain delayed transactions.
Checking Robustness Against Snapshot Isolation 25
Proof. We suppose by contradiction that β contains a delayed transaction t0
issued by a process p0.
It is important to notice that there must exist β′ ⊂ β and com(p0, t0) ∈ β
such that isu(p0, t0) happens before com(p0, t0) through β. Otherwise, we can
commute the events until com(p0, t0) occurs just after isu(p0, t0) and in this case
transaction t0 is not delayed by p0. Thus, τ is of the form τ = α · isu(p, t) · β1 ·
isu(p0, t0) · β
′ · com(p0, t0) · β2 · com(p, t).
Notice that we can build happens-before cycle from isu(p0, t0) to com(p0, t0).
Also, since in β1 · isu(p0, t0)·β
′ ·com(p0, t0)·β2 no transaction depends on isu(p, t).
Thus, we can safely remove isu(p, t) and its associated commit event com(p, t)
and obtains: τ ′ = α · β1 · isu(p0, t0) · β
′ · com(p0, t0) · β2. which is an anomaly
because of the cycle formed as isu(p0, t0) happens-before com(p0, t0) through β
′.
In τ ′, transaction t was not delayed, therefore, τ ′ has less number of delays than
τ . Thus, τ is not a minimal anomaly, a contradiction to our hypothesis.
The next lemma characterizes the relation between the first delayed transac-
tion and the commit of the underlying transaction. It shows the type of the first
and last happens-before relations in the happens-before path between the issue
of the only delayed transaction and its corresponding commit.
Lemma 6. Let τ = α · isu(p, t) · β · com(p, t) be a minimal anomaly under
SI. Then, the following must hold: There exist (p0, t0), (p1, t1) ∈ β where
(isu(p, t), (p0, t0)) ∈ RW, and ((p1, t1), com(p, t)) ∈ RW.
Proof. We have that since isu(p, t) happens-before com(p, t) through β and β
does not contain a delayed transaction. Then, there must exist (p0, t0) and
(p1, t1) in β such that (isu(p, t), (p0, t0)) ∈ HB
1, ((p1, t1), com(p, t)) ∈ HB
1, and
((p0, t0), (p1, t1)) ∈ HB. It is important to note that (p0, t0) and (p1, t1) might
be identical in which case β = (p0, t0).
Notice that every event in β (including (p0, t0) and (p1, t1)) cannot write to
a variable that (p, t) writes to under SI semantics, thus store order relation is
not possible. Also, since (p, t) is not visible to any event in β thus the read-
from and program order are not possible. Thus, the only possibility is that
(isu(p, t), (p0, t0)) ∈ RW, and ((p1, t1), com(p, t)) ∈ RW.
C Proofs of Section 5: The Complete Instrumentation
In this section, we present the instrumentation for the remaining instructions
which are, begin and commit for the attacker and happens-before helper.
C.1 Instrumentation of the Attacker
We provide in Figure 9, the instrumentation of the code for the attacker process.
When the attacker randomly chooses a transaction to delay, it sets the flag atrA
to true in the instruction begin (line (15)). Then, it sets the flag p.a to 1 to
26 S.M. Beillahi, A. Bouajjani, and C. Enea.
indicate that the current process is the attacker. It copies the values from every
variable x to its primed version x′.
In the case the attacker starts the happens-before chain, it has to set the
variable HB to true to mark the start of the happens-before chain and the end of
the visibility chain and set the flag x.event to ld (line (2) in Figure 3). We can
notice that when the HB is set to true, we can no longer execute new transactions
from the attacker (all conditions in lines (13) and (14) become false).
[[l1: com; goto l2;]]A =
// Typical execution of commit
l1: assume atrA =⊥ ∨ p.a 6=⊥ ; goto lx1;
lx1: com; goto l2;
// Succeeded Commit of delayed transaction
l1: assume atrA 6=⊥ ∧ HB 6=⊥ ; goto lx2;
lx2: com; goto l2;
// Failed commit of delayed transaction
l1: assume atrA 6=⊥ ∧ HB =⊥ ; assume false; (12)
[[l1: begin; goto l2;]]A =
// Typical execution of begin
l1: assume HB =⊥ ∧(p.a 6=⊥ ∨atrA =⊥); goto lx1; (13)
lx1: begin; goto l2;
// Begin of delayed transaction
l1: assume HB =⊥ ∧ atrA =⊥ ; goto lx2; (14)
lx2: begin; goto lx3;
lx3: p.a := 1; goto lx4;
lx4: Foreach x ∈ V. x
′
:= x; goto lx5;
lx5: atrA := true; goto l2; (15)
Fig. 9: Instrumentation of the Attacker
C.2 Instrumentation of the Happens-Before Helpers
In Figure 10, we provide the instrumentation of the remaining instructions of a
happens-before helper.
When the flag HB is set to true, a process (which cannot be the attacker, i.e.,
the flag p.a is null) starts the attempts to join the set of happens-before helpers.
Thus, it randomly chooses a first transaction (the begin of this transaction is
shown in line (16)) through which the process will join the set of happens-before
helpers. When a process chose the transaction to join happens-before helpers,
that means it has made pledge that during this transaction it will either do
read from a variable that was updated by a another delayed transaction from
some other process in happens-before helpers or write to a variable that was
accessed with a read or write from another process in happens-before helpers.
When either one of these criteria are satisfied the flag p.hbh will be set to true. If
a process does not keep its pledge (the flag p.hbh is null) then before executing
the com instruction of the first transaction we block the execution (line (20)).
The happens-before helpers processes continue executing their instructions,
until one of them executes a load that reads from the shared variable x that was
stored in astA which implies the existence of a happens-before cycle. When exe-
cuting the instruction com at the end of every transaction, we have a conditional
check to detect if we have a load or a write accessing the variable x (lines (17),
(18), and (19)). When the check detects that the variable x was accessed, the
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execution goes to the error state (line (19)) to indicate that the execution has
produced an anomaly and we denote the reached state of the instrumented pro-
gram’s execution, the error state.
[[l1: begin; goto l2;]]HbH =
// Begin before joining happens-before
l1: assume HB =⊥ ∧p.a =⊥ ; goto lx1;
lx1: begin; goto l2;
// Begin of first transactions to join
// happens-before
l1: assume HB 6=⊥ ∧p.hbh = p.a =⊥ ; goto lx2;
lx2: begin; goto lx3; (16)
// Copying flags before the first transaction
// starts executing and modifying the flags
lx3: Foreach x ∈ V. x.eventI := x.event; goto l2;
// Begin after joining happens-before
l1: assume HB 6=⊥ ∧ p.hbh 6=⊥ ; goto lx4;
lx4: begin; goto l2;
[[l1: com; goto l2;]]HbH =
// Commit before joining happens-before
l1: assume HB =⊥ ∧p.a =⊥ ; goto lx1;
lx1: com; goto l2;
// Commit after joining happens-before
l1: assume HB 6=⊥ ∧ p.hbh 6=⊥ ; goto lx2;
lx2: com; goto lx3;
lx3: r˜ := astA; goto lx4; (17)
lx4: r˜ := r˜.event; goto lx5; (18)
// Commit after reaching the error state
lx5: assume r˜ 6=⊥ ; assert false; (19)
lx5: assume r˜ =⊥ ; goto l2;
// Failed attempt to join happens-before
l1: assume HB 6=⊥ ∧ p.hbh = p.a =⊥ ; assume false; (20)
Fig. 10: Instrumentation of Happens-Before Helpers Processes
As a direct consequence of Theorem 2, the next corollary states that some
programs which have certain characteristics are robust against SI.
Corollary 2. Given a program P, if one of the following holds:
(a) every transaction of P contains a single instruction either a read or a write;
(b) every transaction of P contains only read/write events that access a single
variable (different transactions might read/write to different variables);
(c) given a variable x, every transaction of P contains a write to the variable x.
then P is robust under SI.
D Proofs of Section 5: Soundness and Completeness of
the Instrumentation
The aim of the instrumentation procedure is to reduce the problem of check-
ing the existence of the anomaly described in Theorem 4 to reachability under
serialisability of en error state by the instrumented version of a program. The
instrumentation procedure is considered sound and complete iff if an error state
is reachable, then we can reconstruct an anomaly, and every anomaly ensures
that the error state is reachable by the instrumented version of the program.
Theorem 5 (Soundness and Completeness). A program P is not robust iff
the instrumented version of it, P ′, reaches an error state under SER.
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Proof. Soundness. Suppose that the instrumented program reaches an error
state. Then, the execution’s trace of the instrumented program is of the form:
τ⋆ = τ1 · isu(p, t) · τ2 · (p
′, t′)
The last transaction, (p′, t′) performed by a process p′′ that has a read accessing
the variable x = astA and is part of the happens-before helpers. Because the
conditional check can be performed only by a process (pHbH1) that is one of the
happens-before helpers and is currently executing.
In order for pHbH1, to join the set of happens-before helpers, it must have
found that the valuation of the flag HB is not null which means there exists
some process p that is the attacker that sets the flag HB to true. In τ1, the
attacker, happens-before helpers, and other processes start executing the original
instructions without setting any flags or delaying any transactions. Afterwards,
the attacker issues the delayed transaction isu(p, t) and it starts populating the
primed variables x′ and reading from them and setting the flags x.event′ to 1
for every variable x that it writes to and y.event to ld for every variable y that
it reads from. During the execution of t, the attacker sets the flag HB to true.
Hence, the happens-before helpers start checking at every instruction whether
the flags x.event are set to either st or ld. If so, they start populating the flags
x.event and l.event as well. When HB is set to true, the attacker stop issuing
new transactions. Therefore, all transaction in τ2 are from the happens-before
helpers.
We now transform τ⋆ into the following execution trace:
τ = τ ′1 · isu(p, t) · τ
′
2 · com(p, t)
Here, τ ′1 is the subsequence of all τ1 events that are produced by instructions
from P without the conditionals checking (i.e., the assume statements). The
transaction t which is executed by the attacker represents the delayed transac-
tions in τ with the removal of the conditionals checking and the flags setting. τ ′2
is the subsequence of all events of τ2 produced by transactions from P which are
executed only by the happens-before helpers except the conditionals checking
and the flags setting. We add the commit of transaction com(p0, t) to describe
the commit of the delayed transaction that was delayed by the attacker. τ is a
possible execution’s trace of the program P because τ⋆ is result of an execution
of the instrumented version of P and we have removed from τ all the effects of
the instrumentation, and replaced the stores to auxiliary variables by issues of
stores without changing the dependency between all the events in the execution.
All transactions in τ ′2 are from the happens-before helpers. Transactions in
τ ′2 form a happens-before path between isu(p, t) and com(p, t). Also, we have
a, b = (p′, t′) ∈ τ ′2 such that (isu(p, t), a) ∈ RW(y) and (b, com(p, t)) ∈ RW(x).
No transaction in τ ′2 writes to a variable that t writes to. Hence, τ indeed holds
all the properties of the anomaly described in Theorem 4.
Completeness. Suppose we have an anomaly of a given program P :
τ = τ1 · isu(p, t) · τ2 · com(p, t)
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such that τ maintains all the properties given in Theorem 4. We demonstrate
that there is a possible serializable execution based on τ of the instrumented
version of the program P that reaches the error state. Next, we show how to
build the instrumented program execution.
At the start of the execution, τ1, the attacker, happens-before helpers, and
other processes execute the original transactions with just conditional checks.
Afterwards, the attacker delays the transaction isu(p, t) and starts populating
the flags. In isu(p, t), the attacker issues a store to the shared variable ‘x‘ = astA
and ∃ b ∈ τ2 such that (b, com(p, t)) ∈ RW(x). All writes that were executed
in t by the attacker are invisible to the remaining processes which includes the
happens-before helpers. While executing t, the attacker sets the content of the
flag y.event to ld for every variable y that it reads from and it sets the flag HB
to true.
On the other hand, the processes which are executing their transactions with-
out delaying them will attempt to join the happens-before helpers by checking
if the flag HB is set to true. If so, they start the attempt of joining the happens-
before helpers and when it succeed they joining the happens-before helpers and
start executing their transactions which constitute τ2. The first executed trans-
action by the happens-before helpers is a described above which signals the start
of τ2 and the happen before dependency. Thus, in τ2, we have only transactions
form the happens-before helpers (because the attacker stop when the flag HB is
set to true) such that they are related by the happen before dependency that
started from isu(p, t) until it reaches com(p, t) through τ2. We know that there
must exist b ∈ τ2 such that (b, com(p, t)) ∈ RW(‘x‘ = astA). b is equivalent to the
last executed transaction by the happens-before helpers that accesses the shared
variable x. Thus, the underlying happens-before helper will set the content of
the flag x.event to ld. Hence, when the underlying process executes the com
instruction of this transaction, it will go to the error state (lines (17), (18), and
(19)) and in this case the instrumented version of the program P has reached
the desired error state.
E Proofs of Section 6
The following theorem shows that the acyclicity of the commutativity depen-
dency graph of a program implies the robustness of the program. Actually, the
notion of robustness in this theorem relies on a slightly different notion of trace
where store-order and write-order dependencies take into account values, i.e.,
store-order relates only transactions writing different values and the write-order
relates a reading transaction to the oldest transaction (w.r.t. execution order)
writing its value. In more details, we assume that two transactions are WW-
related iff they write different values. Notice that since RW is defined using WW
then when two transactions are WW-related iff they write different values then
when two transactions are RW-related this implies that the value that is read is
different than the one that is written. For example, in Figure 11a, if we don’t
have this weakening ofWW we get an execution trace, where the happens-before
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p1:
t1: [r1 = y //0
x = 1]
||
p2:
t2: [y = 1
z = 1]
||
p3:
t3: [z = 1
r3 = x] //0
(a) Robust program when weakeningWW.
p1:
t1: [r1 = y //0
x = 1]
||
p2:
t2: [y = 1
z = 0]
||
p3:
t3: [r2 = z //0
r3 = x] //0
(b) Robust program when weakening WR.
Fig. 11: Examples of robust programs.
is cyclic, of the form τ = isu(p1, t1) · (p2, t2) · (p3, t3) · com(p1, t1) because of the
WW relation that links (p2, t2) and (p3, t3). However, with our weakening ofWW
there will be noWW relation between (p2, t2) and (p3, t3) and this the above exe-
cution can be equivalently rewritten as τ = (p3, t3) · isu(p1, t1)com(p1, t1) ·(p2, t2)
which is serializable. Similarly, we assume that two transactions t1 and t2 are
related by WR iff when we swap the two transactions t2 does not read the same
value that t1 is writing. For instance, in Figure 11b, if we don’t have this as-
sumption we get an execution trace, where the happens-before is cyclic, of the
form τ = isu(p1, t1) · (p2, t2) · (p3, t3) ·com(p1, t1) because of the WR relation that
links (p2, t2) and (p3, t3). However, with our assumption on WR there will be
no WR relation between (p2, t2) and (p3, t3) and this the above execution can
be equivalently rewritten as τ = (p3, t3) · isu(p1, t1)com(p1, t1) · (p2, t2) which is
serializable. This approach helps in avoiding some of the harmless anomalies,
where the happens before cycle might be caused by a write-write dependency
between two transactions that writes the same values.
Theorem 6. For a program P, if (1) the commutativity dependency graph of P
does not contain non-mover cycles, then (2) P is robust.
Proof. We prove the contrapositive, i.e., ¬(2)⇒ ¬(1). For the proof, we use the
result of Theorem 2.
Assuming that the program P is not robust. Then, based on Theorem 2 there
must exist an execution of the instrumentation of P that reaches the error state.
We suppose that t is the delayed transaction, tins is the instrumentation of t
(writes are stored in auxiliary registers), and p is the attacker process. Therefore,
the execution of the instrumentation of P that reaches the error state is of the
form τ = α · (p, tins) · a · β · b where a writes to a variable that t reads from and
b reads from a variable that t writes to. We assume that b is the first event that
does read that accesses a variable that t writes to. In the following we show that
the commutativity dependency graph of P contains a non-mover cycle where t
is t0. We consider two cases, first case when a = b and β = ǫ, and second case is
when a 6= b.
First case: τ = α · (p, tins) · a where a writes to a variable that t reads
from, reads from a variable that t writes to, and does not write to a variable
that t writes to. Assume that a = (p1, t1). Thus, we can safely obtain τ0 =
α · (p1, t1) · (p, t
′) a serializable execution trace of P where t′ is the reads free
instantiation of t. Since ((p1, t1), com(p, t)) ∈ RW then t1 reads a value that
t′ is overwriting with a different value. Therefore, τ ′0 = α · (p, t
′) · (p1, t1) is
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either a serializable execution with a different end state than τ0 has or it is
not an serializable execution. Thus, (t1, t
′) ∈ MRW and t1 does not write to a
variable that t writes to. Similarly, we can safely obtain τn = α · (p, t
′′) · (p1, t1)
a serializable execution trace of P where t′′ is the writes free instantiation of t.
Since (isu(p, t), (p1, t1)) ∈ RW then t
′′ reads a value that t1 is overwriting with a
different value. Therefore, τ ′n = α ·(p1, t1)·(p, t
′′) is either a serializable execution
with a different end state than τn has or it is not an serializable execution. Thus,
(t′′, t1) ∈ MRW and t1 does not write to a variable that t writes to.
Second case: τ = α · (p, tins) · a · β · b where a writes to a variable that t
reads from, b reads from a variable that t writes to, and every transaction in
a ·β · b does not write to a variable that t writes to. Assume that a = (p1, t1) and
b = (pn, tn). Since the transactions in (p1, t1) ·β · (pn, tn) constitute the happens-
before path in the execution trace τ . Then, for every (pi, ti), (pi+1, ti+1) ∈
(p1, t1) ·β · (pn, tn) we have that ((pi, ti), (pi+1, ti+1)) ∈ (PO∪WR∪WW∪RW).
In the case ((pi, ti), (pi+1, ti+1)) ∈ (WR ∪ WW ∪ RW), we can safely obtain
τi = α ·γ · (pi, ti) · (pi+1, ti+1) which is a serializable execution trace of P where γ
either empty (i.e., ǫ) or γ = (p1, t1)·· · ··(pi−1, ti−1). Since, ((pi, ti), (pi+1, ti+1)) ∈
(WR ∪WW ∪ RW), then swapping ti and ti + 1 will result in either reordering
of writes or write overwrites a read, or read obtains a different value. Therefore,
τ ′i = α·γ·(pi+1, ti+1)·(pi, ti) is either a serializable execution trace with a different
end state than τi has or it is not an serializable execution trace. Thus, (ti, ti+1) ∈
MRW. Also, we have that ti and ti+1 do not write to a variable that t writes to.
Similar to the first case, we can safely obtain τ0 = α · (p1, t1) · β · (pn, tn) · (p, t
′)
a serializable execution trace of P where t′ is the reads free instantiation of
t. Since ((pn, tn), com(p, t)) ∈ RW then tn reads a value that t
′ is overwriting
with a different one. Therefore, τ ′0 = α · (p1, t1) · β · (p, t
′) · (pn, tn) is either
a serializable execution with a different end state than τ0 has or it is not an
serializable execution trace. Thus, (tn, t
′) ∈ MRW and tn does not write to a
variable that t writes to. Furthermore, we can safely obtain τn = α·(p, t
′′)·(p1, t1)
a serializable execution trace of P where t′′ is the writes free instantiation of t.
Since (isu(p, t), (p1, t1)) ∈ RW then t
′′ reads a value that t1 is overwriting with
a different one. Then, τ ′n = α · (p1, t1) · (p, t
′′) is either a serializable execution
trace with a different end state than τn has or it is not an serializable execution
trace. Thus, (t′′, t1) ∈ MRW and t1 does not write to a variable that t writes to.
F Experiments Appendix
In this section we describe the applications we used to evaluate our techniques.
For every table in the original application program, we added a boolean anno-
tation in our formalization of the table in Boogie, in order, to inspect whether
a given record does exist in the table or not. For instance, if we consider the
following table Customer(CustomerId, CustomerName), in Boogie, we formalize
the table as two maps: CustomerAlive which takes a CustomerId and returns
true if there is a customer with underlying id and else otherwise, CustomerTable
which takes a CustomerId and returns the corresponding CustomerName. Also,
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in certain cases we formalize a Table as multiple maps. Below, we describe each
application.
Auction [5]: Which has five transactions that manipulate three tables: BIDS,
ITEMS, and USERS. Transaction RegBid is for placing a bid on an item. Trans-
action RegUser is for registration a user. Transaction ViewItem is for viewing
the number of bids for an item. Transaction ViewUser is for looking at a user
name. Transaction ViewUsers is for looking at all registered users.
Cassieq-Core2: A core unit of a distributed queue. It has eight transactions that
manipulate a single table: USERACCOUNTS. Transaction AddNewAccount is
for adding a new account in USERACCOUNTS. Transaction DeleteAnAccount
is for deleting an account from USERACCOUNTS. Transaction AddNewKey is
for adding a new key to an existing account in USERACCOUNTS. Transaction
DeleteAKey is removing a key from an existing account in USERACCOUNTS.
Transaction GetAnAccount is to check whether there exist an account with
a given id in the table USERACCOUNTS. Transaction GetAccounts is to re-
turn all existing accounts in USERACCOUNTS. Transaction GetAccountKeys
is for getting all the keys of certain account in USERACCOUNTS. Transaction
GetAccountKey is to check whether a certain account does hold a certain key
in USERACCOUNTS.
Courseware [13, 18]: Which has five transactions that manipulate three ta-
bles: STUDENT, COURSE, and ENROLED. Transaction RegisterStudent is for
registering a new student in the table STUDENT. Transaction AddCourse is for
adding a new course in the table COURSE. Transaction EnrollStudent is for en-
rolling a given registered student in a given course. Transaction RemoveCourse is
for removing a given course from the table COURSE. Transaction QueryCourses
is for inspecting courses in the table COURSE.
Currency-Exchange3: A trading service. It has six transactions that manip-
ulate a single table: TRADES. Transaction SaveTrade is for registering a new
trade. Transaction ViewListTrades is for viewing the trades that occurred be-
fore a given instance of time. Transaction ViewTrade is for inspecting a given
trade. Transaction ViewTradeUser is for looking for a user who carried out a
given trade. Transaction GetNbTrades is for inspecting the number of trades.
Transaction GetTradeTimeStamp is for looking for the time stamp of a given
trade.
FusionTicket [15]: Which has four transactions that manipulate a single ta-
ble: EVENTS. Transaction AddEvent is adding new event in some given venue.
Transaction ViewEvent is for looking at given a event and the number of tick-
ets available at this event. Transaction Browse is for looking at events that are
planned in some given venue. Transaction Purchase is for buying a ticket at a
certain event.
2 https://github.com/paradoxical-io/cassieq
3 https://github.com/Haiyan2/Trade
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Shopping-Cart4: An on-line shop service implemented over Cassandra. It has
four transactions that query two tables: USERS and PRODUCTS. Transaction
GetUser is for querying the existence of a user in the table USERS. Transac-
tion GetProductsByCategory is for finding products that are in a given category.
Transaction GetProductByUPC is for finding a product through its UPC. Trans-
action GetCategories is for finding the categories.
Playlist5: An on-line music service. It has fourteen transactions that manipulate
three tables: USERS, TRACKS, and ARTISTS. Transaction AddTrack is for
adding a new track in the table TRACKS. Transaction GetTrack is for getting
a certain track from the table TRACKS. Transaction AddUser is for adding a
new user in the table USERS. Transaction GetUser is for looking for a certain
user in the table USERS. Transaction CreatePlayList is for creating a playlist
of certain user in the table USERS. Transaction ListArtistByLetter is for listing
artists by their first letters of their names. Transaction ListSongsByArtist is
for listing tracks produced by certain artist. Transaction ListSongsByGenre is
for listing tracks of certain genre type. Transaction AddTrackToPlaylist is for
adding an existing track (in TRACKS) to an existing user play list in the table
USERS. Transaction DeleteTrackFromPlaylist is for removing a track from user
play list in the table USERS. Transaction GetPlaylistForUser is for getting the
contents of certain play list of certain user. Transaction GetPlaylistNames is for
getting all the play lists of certain user. Transaction DeletePlayListForUser is
for deleting a certain user’s play list. Transaction DeleteUser is deleting a user
from the table USERS.
RoomStore6: A messages bot service. It has five transactions that manipu-
late a single table: MESSAGES. Transaction AddMessage is for adding a new
message to the table MESSAGES. Transaction GetLastMessage is for getting
the messages of given user. Transaction GetMessages is for looking for messages
that were added in a certain date. Transaction GetSpecificMessage is for get-
ting specific message that was added in a certain date and time. Transaction
GetTopicMessages is for getting messages that are of certain topic.
SmallBank [2]: Which has five transactions that manipulate three tables: AC-
COUNT, SAVING, and CHECKING. Transaction Balance is for looking at
both the saving and checking balances of a given user account. Transaction
DepositChecking is for depositing a certain amount into the checking balance.
Transaction TransactSaving is for depositing or withdrawing into/form the sav-
ing balance. Transaction Amalgamate (Amg) is for moving the saving and check-
ing balances of an account to another account checking balance and resetting the
saving and checking balances of the first account to zero. TransactionWriteCheck
is for withdrawing from a given account’s checking balance.
TPC-C [23]: Which has five transactions that manipulate nine tables: WARE-
HOUSE, DISTRICT, STOCK, ITEMS, CUSTOMERS, HISTORY, ORDER,
4 https://github.com/nikhilswagle/Shopping Cart Angular Cassandra
5 https://github.com/DataStaxDocs/playlist
6 https://github.com/mebigfatguy/roomstore
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NEWORDER, and ORDERLINE. Transaction NewOrder is for placing a new
order on a set of items. Transaction Delivery is for delivering a withstanding or-
der at certain warehouse. Transaction Payment is for a given customer paying a
withstanding amount of credit. Transaction OrderStatus is for inspecting certain
orders and the associated order lines. Transaction StockLevel is for inspecting
stocks at certain warehouse and the withstanding orders at this warehouse.
